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Executive Summary 
  
At the request of Terrell State Hospital and MHMR, the Energy Systems Laboratory at Texas A&M 
University investigated the failure of the PVC pipes serving the chilled water loop at Terrell State 
Hospital. There were two PVC pipe failures where the PVC pipe bulged out. Based on laboratory test 
result and trend data from the building automatic control system, it is concluded that the deadheading of 
building chilled water pump caused the failure. However, it is not clear what caused the building isolation 
valve to close that resulted in pump deadheading. We are still investigating the cause. 
 
The failed PVC pipe was sent to Materials Performance Inc for testing. Short and long-term 
mechanical properties were compared for a section from the failed pipe and a new PVC pipe. Results on 
both tests indicate that the mechanical properties for the failed pipe were similar to that of a new PVC 
pipe. The possibility of defective PVC pipe material that caused the failure was ruled out. 
 
Several pressure transmitters were installed in various locations throughout the chilled water loop. 
Monitoring of the chilled water loop pressure did not show unusual water pressure in the loop.  
 
During the course of this investigation, it was found from the building automation system that the 
failed section of the PVC pipe was located closed to a chilled water pump which had been accidentally 
deadheading for over 52 hours prior to the second failure. It is concluded that the failure of the PVC pipe 
was caused by high temperature inside the pipe as a result of pump deadheading. This conclusion is 
strengthened by high chilled water temperature measured (170°F) after similar chilled water pump 
deadheading situations occurred in buildings at Texas A&M recently.  
 
 Introduction 
 
Terrell State Hospital has a chilled water loop which supplies chilled water to major buildings on the 
campus. The chilled water pipe is direct buried PVC pipe. In June and July of 1999, there were two (2) 
PVC pipe failures which occurred at Building 691. 
  
Refer to the schematic of the piping in Figure 1. Chilled water is delivered to Building 691 by direct 
buried PVC pipes. The PVC pipes come out of the ground and joint the building pipes, see Figure 2. The 
building pipe is made of steel. There is one building chilled water pump that is equipped with a variable 
frequency drive for the motor. An isolation valve is installed in the return pipe inside the building.  
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Figure 1. Schematic of the campus chilled water loop. 
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Figure 2. Schematic of the chilled water loop at Building 691. 
The first failure occurred at the junction of the PVC pipe and the steel pipe on the chilled water 
supply side, approximately 50 feet upstream of the building chilled water pump. Figure 3(a) is the picture 
of the ballooned PVC pipe. The failed PVC pipe was removed and replaced by a new steel pipe about 20 
feet long. The second failure occurred at the place where the new steel pipe made the connection with the 
PVC pipe. Figure 3(b) shows the failed section. Note that the pipe just started to swell. 
 
 (a)  (b) 
  
Figure 3. Failed section of the PVC pipe with flange in one end. 
  
When the second failed PVC pipe was removed, it was found that one section of the PVC pipe had a 
lot of bulges inside the pipe. See Figure 4. 
 
  
 Figure 4. Inside of the PVC pipe cut from places closed to the failed sections. 
 Testing and Analysis 
  
The failed PVC pipe was sent to a material performance company to determine the quality of the 
pipe. At the same time, ESL investigated the operating history of the building, the chiller plants, and the 
thermal storage tank. Chilled water pressures at different locations were monitored and recorded for 2 
months. The following are the detailed findings. 
 
Material Testing 
The PVC pipe was sent to Materials Performance Inc, a company specialized in material performance 
testing, for evaluation. Short and long-term mechanical properties were compared for a section from the 
failed pipe and a new PVC pipe. Results on both tests indicate that the mechanical properties for the 
failed pipe were similar to that of a new PVC pipe. A complete copy of the test report is attached at the 
end of this report. 
 
Analysis 
There are two CSI controllers inside Building 691. One controller controls the chilled water pump, 
building isolation valve, and monitors the chilled water temperature and pressure. The other controller, 
which is a less expensive type, controls all 9 AHUs in the building. 
 
The chilled water pressures at building 691, the main chiller plant, and the thermal storage tank were 
monitored and recorded for two months. No unusual chilled water pressure was observed at those 
locations.  
 
Meanwhile, trend log from the control system indicated that the chilled water pump at Building 691 
had been deadheading during nighttime and weekends prior to the second PVC pipe failure. The building 
control program (refer to page 92 of the Continuous Commissioning Report for Terrell State Hospital, 
ESL 1999) enabled the building chilled water pump based on outside air temperature and the control 
valve position at roof top unit #9 of Building 691. The building isolation valve was controlled by the 
building occupancy schedule, which was from 12:05 am to 8:00 pm on Monday and 6:00 am to 8:00 pm 
from Tuesday to Friday. When the building was occupied or the chilled water pump was enabled, the 
isolation valve opened. There was a 60-second time delay in the DDC (direct digital control) module that 
turns on the chilled water pump. In other words, when the chilled water pump was enabled, the isolation 
valve opened. One minute later, the chilled water pump was turned on. When the building became 
unoccupied, the AHUs stopped and chilled water control valves closed. Chilled water pump also stopped. 
The isolation valve would close unless the chilled water pump was commanded to be on.  
 
There were two types of trending available from the control system for every control point: trending 
with an archive cell and trending without an archive cell.  For points trended with archive cells, the 
historical data can be retrieved from the computer hard drive provided that the trend data is archived 
regularly. For points trended without archived cells, however, the data is not collected in the computer 
hard drive. Instead, certain amount of data is stored in the controller panel and can be displayed on the 
control screen if needed.  
 
Chilled water pump status was trended without an archived cell. Trend plot printed on July 23, 1999 
showed that the pump was commanded to be on from July 8 to July 20, 1999, prior to the second PVC 
pipe failure was discovered (Earlier trend data is not available from the control system).  Although the 
AHUs were supposed to be shut down after 8:00 pm, they were actually running continuously due to 
control program difficulties (discussed in the next section). Since the building chilled water pump 
operated according to chilled water valve position, it kept running in order to maintain the cold deck 
temperature set point. Unfortunately, the isolation valve still operated according to the occupancy 
schedule. Consequently, the building chilled water pump was deadheading during the unoccupied periods. 
The maximum deadheading length was 52 hours during the weekend (from 8:00 pm on Friday to 12:05 
am on Monday). 
 
There was no interlock between the building chilled water pump and the isolation valve such that the 
isolation valve verified the chilled water pump status before it shut off. This could also potentially cause 
water hammers when the building becomes unoccupied, since the isolation valve is an industrial type 
electricity-driven valve, which was observed to take actions (closing or opening) in a few seconds. 
 
Control Program Problems 
The control program failed to turn off the AHUs when the building became unoccupied. The exact 
cause of this failure is unclear. The building had past history of "corrupted internal program", as described 
by CSI maintenance personnel and it was listed in the recommendations in the "Continuous 
Commissioning Report for Terrell State Hospital" (page 96). 
 
Conversations with David Wilhite revealed that there were some wiring problems for power supply to 
control panels in buildings 650, 675, 679, and 691. CSI maintenance personnel have been to Terrell State 
Hospital to fix the problem after it was discovered in March 2000 by David. Since one of Building 691's 
control panel was in the list, the wiring problems may caused the controller to keep reconfiguring itself in 
order to communicate with the host computer. Control commands from the control program may have 
been lost during the process. We contacted David and ran a test by putting the control program prior to 
the PVC failure back into the system and observed the operation. We changed the time schedule to make 
the building unoccupied, however, the isolation was still open while the pump was running. 
 
 
 Comparison and Analysis with Similar Incidents Occurred at TAMU 
We are able to collect some information of two similar incidents happened on Texas A&M University 
campus, which has a total of more than 14 million ft2 conditioned area and more than 130 major 
buildings.  As Terrell State Hospital, most buildings receive chilled water from the central plant(s) 
through campus loops.   
 
Case 1: 
One of the two incidents happened in the beginning of January 2000.  Right before the incident, some 
loop work was performed and the building had to be isolated from the campus loops with its isolation 
valves.  Meanwhile, building chilled water pump was turned off.  As shown in Figure 5, four valves (2 
sets of supply and return valves) were shut to isolate the building, and the manual valve in the building 
bypass line had been shut at an earlier time.  After loop work was done, a different operator was assigned 
to go to the building to put it back on line, who only opened two of the four closed valves (1 set of supply 
and return valves) and turned on the building chilled water pump.  After a couple of days, hot call came 
from the building, and hot water temperature was measured in the chilled water line.  It was thought that 
somehow the chilled water lines of this building was cross connected to the campus domestic hot water 
loop, which normally have a supply water temperature around 150 °F.  Later, another team went to the 
building and checked the valves.  One of the two closed valves was opened, and the other one was 
assumed to be open since the valve could not be turned due to rusty conditions.  Finally, this closed valve 
was identified and opened, and the building was put back to normal operation.  The longest recorded 
pump-deadheading period is about 20 hours (from noon to the next morning 8:00), and the temperature 
besides the pump was measured to be 170 °F after this.   
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Figure 5. Case 1: deadheading of a 5-hp building chilled water pump caused 170 °F  
water temperature being measured in the chilled water line 
 
 
 
 
Case 2: 
Another incident happened a little earlier in a mechanical lab, where a water loop with a 5 hp pump 
was set up for some testing.  As shown in Figure 6, the discharge side of the pump was built with clear 
plastic pipe for observation of the local flow pattern and conditions.  One day, the pump was left 
deadheading, and it was told that the clear plastic pipe was resulted to be "melted". 
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Figure 6. Case 2: deadheading of a 5-hp lab pump caused  
clear plastic pipe at discharge side "melted" 
 
 
 
Comparison of these three cases was summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Comparison of Pump Deadhead Incidents at TAMU and TSH 
Case  Detailed Diagram Where 
Pump 
Size Period 
Pipe 
Material Reason 
Normal 
Water T Results 
1 Figure 5 One Tamu bldg. 5 hp 20 hrs Steel 
Manual 
valve(s) 
shut 
Chilled 
water, 44 °F 
170 °F measured 
close to pump   
2 Figure 6 One Tamu lab 5 hp N/A 
Clear 
Plastic 
Manual 
valve shut 
City Water, 
Room T 
Clear plastic pipe 
"melted" 
3 Figure 7 TSH Bldg. 691 7.5 hp 58 hrs 
PVC/ 
Steel 
Return 
control 
valve shut 
Chilled 
water, 40 °F 
Caused upstream 
(about 50 ft away) 
PVC pipe failure? 
 
 
 
EES Software Simulation: 
From some study and research, we found the pump-deadheading situation is hard to be simulated.  The 
conduction and convection model is complicated and even hard to define.  By making quite a few 
assumptions, we did a very preliminary simulation analysis by putting together some basic energy balance 
equations, just trying to provide some ideas. 
 
Field conditions:  
1. 4" PVC pipe and steel pipe,  
2. 7.5 hp building chilled water pump. 
 
Assumptions:  
1. Normal chilled water supply temperature Ts = 40 °F,  
2. Deadheading period = 58 hours (Friday 8:00 p.m. until the next Monday 6: a.m.),  
3. Pipes were well insulated,  
4. 50 % of the electricity consumed by the deadheaded pump (assuming 6 hp) was absorbed by the 
stagnant water as heat to increase its temperature. 
5. The stagnant water temperature increased universally. 
6. There is no any kind of heat transfer process between the stagnant water that were heated up and the 
environment (beyond water, beyond piping, ground soil, air, etc.). 
 
Conclusion:  
The heat generated by the deadheaded pump can heat up 3,400 lbs. water from 40 °F to 170 °F, which 
is equivalent to 620 feet of 4" pipe full of water.  
 
 
 Conclusions 
We felt that the PVC pipe failure was caused by the deadheading of building chilled water pump. 
However, the cause of the deadheading is not clear yet. We will continue to investigate the problem. 
Meanwhile, it is recommended that we keep the building isolation valve open (has been implemented 
after the failure) and fix any wiring problems at the buildings. 
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INVESTIGATION OF PVC PIPE FAILURE AT A MHMR FACILITY 
 
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Materials Performance, Inc. has investigated the failure of PVC piping used for water 
chillers in a HVAC system at a MHMR facility.  Short and long-term mechanical 
properties were compared for a pipe piece sectioned from the failure with a new PVC 
pipe.  Results on both tests indicate that the mechanical properties for the pipe in 
question were similar to a new piece of pipe in both short and long-term testing at 
several temperatures.     During the course of the investigation, it was learned that the 
circulation pump may have been dead-headed causing an increase in temperature at 
the PVC pipe.  It is speculated that the increase in temperature and pressure from the 
dead-heading of the pump lead to the failure of the PVC pipe.  We would recommend 
that a thermocouple and pressure gauge be placed at the failure location under 
deadheaded conditions to confirm the actual temperature and pressure increases. 
II. TESTING PROCEDURES 
Materials and delivery 
Pipe sections from the failures were delivered to our laboratories for the investigation.  
Figure 1 shows a ballooned portion of the pipe adjacent to a flange that connected to a 
steel pipe.  Figure 2 shows the flange connection were the PVC pipe attached to a 
metal pipe that proceeded to a circulation pump.  The flange appeared to be warped 
due to excess heat. 
1 5 0 1  F M  2 8 1 8 ,  S U I T E  2 0 8  •  C O L L E G E  S T A T I O N ,  T X  •  7 7 8 4 0  
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 Figure 1:  HVAC water chiller PVC pipe that ballooned and failed. 
  
Figure 2:  Flange that connected PVC pipe with metal pipe.  It was noted that the 
PVC flange was warped due to excess heat. 
 
Sample Preparation 
Samples were cut from a non-enlarged section of the failed pipe and new pipe in the 
lengthwise direction.  Samples were then machined into ASTM D638 Type I dogbone 
specimens using a template and a router.  The cross-section of each sample was 
measured using a micrometer.  All samples were conditioned at temperature prior to 
loading.  
Testing Equipment 
The loading frames use a lever arm mechanism to provide the stress on the sample.  
The temperature in the environmental chambers shown in Figure 3 were controlled by 
microcontroller connected to a surface mounted thermocouple attached to the sample.  
 
Figure 3:  Creep stands with environmental chamber enclosures used for testing 
PVC tensile specimens. 
III. TESTING RESULTS 
Short-term mechanical properties were determined over a wide range of stresses by 
performing short-time creep tests, measuring displacement and then calculating strain 
as a function of time.  The samples were progressively loaded to 1500 psi, 3000 psi, 
4000 psi, 5000 psi, 6000 psi, and 7000 psi.  The loads and the associated stresses 
were applied for three minutes and then unloaded for 15 minutes.  The displacement as 
a function of time was measured and used to calculate the creep strain as a function of 
time.  These tests were performed at 73 F, 110 F and 150 F.  A comparison of the results 
for the MHMR pipe failure and the new pipe at several stresses are shown in Figures 4-
7, respectively.  Figure 4 shows several load/unloads performed at 150 F and 1500 psi 
loading for each of these tests with only one data set distinctly different from the others.  
Figure 5 shows the same samples after a 15 minute unload with a 3000 psi load 
applied.  Again, only one data set is off from the others with most of the MHMR pipe 
showing less creep strain than the new material.  Figure 6 shows all load/unloads for 
the MHMR and new pipe at 110 F.  Figure 7 shows all load/unload data for the MHMR 
and new pipe at 73 F.  Figures 6 and 7 show that the MHMR and new pipe have about 
the same creep properties under load at various temperatures. 
Long-term creep tests at 1500 psi should approximate the maximum service stress that 
should be observed in practice. Tests were performed at 110 F and 150 F to estimate 
the long-term mechanical properties in service conditions and are shown in Figures 8 
and 9 respectively.  Both graphs show similar long-term creep behavior for the 
materials.      
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 All results except one load/unload test at 1500 psi and 150 F suggest that the 
properties of the MHMR and new material are similar.  This indicates that the pipe 
failure was not a result of inferior material properties, but due to an external 
environmental or loading condition.   
  
 The long-term ASTM pressure rating of the pipe is 160 psi internal pressure.  There 
is a derating factor which is used to reduce allowable design pressure as the 
temperature increases. For PVC it is as follows:  
  
 80 F  0.88  
 90 F   0.75  
 100 F   0.62  
 110 F   0.5  
 120 F   0.4  
 130 F   0.3  
 140 F   0.22 
   
 In other words, if the long-term internal pressure rating of the pipe was 160 psi at 
room temperature it would be reduced to (160)(.22)= 35 psi at 140 F. If the 
temperature went higher then the pressure rating would be reduced even further.  
  
During the course of the investigation, it was learned that the circulation pump may 
have been deadheaded causing an increase in temperature at the PVC pipe.  It is 
speculated that the increase in temperature and pressure from the dead-heading of the 
pump lead to the failure of the PVC pipe.  We noted that the ballooning of the pipe 
occurred in a section near a flange.  Heat generated from deadheading would be 
highest at this point were the PVC pipe contacted metal pipe.  In addition, the pipe at 
this location was unsupported by foam insulation and an additional piece of exterior 
PVC piping as was common to the rest of the piping.  If temperature and pressure build 
up occurred, failure would most likely occur at this location. We would recommend that 
a thermocouple and pressure gauge be placed at the failure location under deadheaded 
conditions to confirm the actual temperature and pressure increases.  Changes in the 
system design or operation could then be made based on this information. 
If you have any further questions regarding the test or conclusions, feel free to contact 
us. 
 
Best regards, 
 
 
Steven Bradley 
 
 
 
 
 
